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The Standard of Admissibility of a Physician's
Expert Testimony in a Chiropractic Malpractice

Action
INTRODUCTION

Chiropractors' are considered by the courts and legislatures to be limited

practitioners of medicine, 2 although not all chiropractors limit their practice
solely to spinal and joint disorders. 3 As practitioners of medicine, chiropractors are subject to malpractice actions* by their injured patients. A
chiropractic malpractice plaintiff, like any malpractice plaintiff, must prove
that a chiropractor-patient relationship existed, that the chiropractor breached
a duty which he or she owed to the plaintiff, that the breach of duty was
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, and that the plaintiff suffered
actual damage. 4 In order to make out this prima facie case, the plaintiff
usually must rely on expert testimony to establish the chiropractor's negligence. 5
Many times the plaintiff chooses to use a physician's testimony to advance
a case against the chiropractor. 6 For the physician to testify, however, the

1. Chiropractic has been defined as "a system of therapeutics based on the theory that
disease is caused by abnormal function of the nervous system and which attempts to restore
normal function through manipulation and treatment of the structures of the body, principally
the spinal column." McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners,12 VAND. L. Rpv.
549, 560 n.62 (1959).
2. See, e.g., Klein v. Harper, 186 N.W.2d 426, 431 (N.D. 1971) (the practice of chiropractic
equals the practice of medicine, in a restricted form); Leffler, Economic and Legal Analysis
of Medical Ethics, 7 LAW & Hum. BEnAv. 183 (1983). Leffler notes that "[c]hiropractors are
licensed as primary health providers in all 50 states. However, to varying degrees they are
'limited practitioners."' Id. at 186.
3. Besides treating spinal and joint disorders, some chiropractors also treat ailments such
as headaches, gastrointestinal disorders, nervous disorders, respiratory conditions, hypertension,
and emotional problems. C. WK, CIoPRAcTIc SPEAKS OUT 32 (1973).
4. See PRossEan AND KEETON ON TEa LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (W. Page Keeton,
5th ed. 1984).
5. E.g., Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318, 325, 492 A.2d 371, 374 (1985) (stating that
"in the ordinary medical malpractice case 'the standard of practice to which [the defendantpractitioner] failed to adhere must be established by expert testimony') (citation omitted);
Kerkman v. Hintz, 138 Wis. 2d 131, 147, 406 N.W.2d 156, 163 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (noting
that "[w]ithout expert testimony, the jury has no standard for determining whether there has
been a breach of the requisite duty of care"), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds,
142 Wis. 2d 404, 418 N.W.2d 795 (1988).
6. Physicians, unlike chiropractors, follow the allopathic school. Annotation, Competency
of Physician or Surgeon of School of Practice Other Than That to Which Defendant Belongs
to Testify in Malpractice Case, 85 A.L.R.2D 1022, 1024 (1962). Physicians believe "that when
the body's workings deviate from normal, a counteracting procedure should be applied." N.
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plaintiff must convince the court that the physician is qualified to give an
expert opinion about some aspect of the case. 7 This process can be troublesome and uncertain in state courts because the standards and rules for
qualification of expert witnesses who are not members of the defendant's
profession or specialty vary and are riddled with exceptions. 8
Because of the extreme importance of expert testimony and the troublesome, uncertain nature of the rules presently followed concerning the
qualification of such expert witnesses, state courts should follow a uniform
standard of admissibility. 9 This Note will discuss the traditional common
law "same school" requirement which is being used by many state courts,
as well as the exceptions to the same school rule. It will also propose that
these courts should follow the approach used in the federal courts and in
other state courts. Finally it will examine the effect which greater state use
of Federal 'Rule of Evidence 702 will have on the parties of a chiropractic
malpractice action and on chiropractic liability in general.
I.

THE PROBLEM: USE OF INCONSISTENT STANDARDS BY STATE
COURTS

State trial courts are not applying consistent rules to decide whether a
physician is qualified to testify as an expert witness in a chiropractic
malpractice action. The majority of courts follow the traditional common
law same school requirement.' 0 This general rule is that a member of "one

ALTMAN, THm CHIROPRACTIC ALTERNATVE: A SPnE OWER's GUIDE 63 (1981). The difference
between the two schools is seen in their approaches to disease:
While allopathic medicine holds that germs and harmful bacteria are the primary
cause of disease, chiropractic maintains that a body which is unhealthy in the
first place is vulnerable to bacteria and germs. A [physician] prescribes a wide
variety of drugs to inhibit or stimulate normal body functions. [A chiropractor]
does not.
Id.
7. Comment, Medical Malpractice-The Necessity of Expert Testimony and the Use of a
General Physician as an Expert Witness in a MalpracticeAction Against a Specialist, 10 Omo
N.U.L. REv. 37, 52 (1983).
8. See id. at 54-72; Note, Evidence-Expert Witnesses-Physician May Qualify as an
Expert in Malpractice Action Against Chiropractor-Rosenbergv. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318, 492
A.2d 371 (1985), 16 SETON HALL L. Rnv. 745 (1986).
9. This Note does not attempt to discuss whether a chiropractor would in turn be qualified
to testify as an expert witness in a medical malpractice action. However, using reasoning
similar to that of this Note, it would appear that such testimony would be allowed. For
decisions allowing a chiropractor's expert testimony in personal injury actions, see Corbin v.
Hittle, 34 Mich. App. 631, 192 N.W.2d 38 (1971) (chiropractor qualified to testify in a personal
injury action concerning matters within the scope of his profession); Klein, 186 N.W.2d at
431 (chiropractor qualified to base his opinion testimony on reasonable medical certainty as
to permanency of back injury).
10. Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1985) (the same school rule "has
been judicially adopted in a majority of states") (citing Annotation, supra note 6, at 1023).
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school of medicine is not competent to testify as an expert in a malpractice

action against a [member] of another school of medicine.""
A. The General Rule
12
Tennessee is one state which strictly follows the same school requirement.
In one recent case, Johnson v. Lawrence, the state appellate court held that

the testimony of physicians was not competent in determining whether a
chiropractor's manipulation of the plaintiff's neck caused plaintiff's stroke. 3
Because the physician and the chiropractor belong to two different schools,
Tennessee courts, as well as many other state courts, will not allow the
physician to give expert testimony in chiropractic malpractice actions.

4

See also Lee v. Miles, 317 F. Supp. 1404 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (medical expert must be of the
same school of practice as defendant); Sandford v. Howard, 161 Ga. App. 495, 288 S.E.2d
739 (1982) (dictum) (expert testimony against chiropractors, unlike podiatrists, must be given
by chiropractors only); Dolan v. Galluzzo, 77 Ill. 2d 279, 285, 396 N.E.2d 13, 16 (1979) ("[Iun
order to testify as an expert on the standard of care in a given school of medicine, the witness
must be licensed therein."); Creasey v. Hogan, 292 Or. 154, 637 P.2d 114 (1981) (medical
expert must be member of same school as defendant).
11. Annotation, supra note 6, at 1023.
12. Also, Tennessee is one state which statutorily disallows an expert witness to testify in
a malpractice action unless he is licensed to practice in some profession making the testimony
relevant to the issue. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-115(b) (1980).
13. 720 S.W.2d 50 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). Spinal manipulation is the "primary therapeutic
tool" used by chiropractors. Wilk v. Am. Medical Ass'n., 719 F.2d 207, 213 (7th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984). "Spinal manipulation also is practiced by osteopathic
physicians, physical therapists, and a small number of medical doctors." Id. at 21J n.4.
14. One court has defined a school of medicine as having "rules and principles of practice
for the guidance of all its members, as respects principles, diagnosis, and remedies, which
each member is supposed to observe in any given case." Nelson v. Harrington, 72 Wis. 591,
598-99, 40 N.W. 228, 231 (1888). As one commentator noted:
The schools of medicine [other than chiropractic] which are mentioned most
often in the cases are: "allopathic," a system using remedies which produce
effects upon the body differing from those produced by disease; . . . "osteopathy," a school of healing which teaches that the body is a vital mechanical
organism whose structural and functional integrity are coordinate and interdependent, the perversion of either constituting disease, the major means of
treatment being manipulation, although surgery is also sometimes undertaken;
. . . "Christian Science," a system of healing through prayer and the triumph
of the mind over matter . .. ; [and] "drugless healing," a system of treatment
involving no drugs or severing or penetration of body tissues except severing of
the umbilical cord at birth.
McCoid, supra note 1, at 560 n.62. Examining the cases with a defendant in a school other
than chiropractic is relevant to the topic of this Note because the same school rule is still
applied and because often the school is treated similarly to the way chiropractic is treated.
See 61 AM. Jum. 2D Physicians, Surgeons and Other Healers § 29 (1981) ("It has been held
that for purposes of regulation, osteopathy and chiropractic are substantially the same system
of treatment, the latter being comprehended within the former, so that a regulatory statute
applicable in terms to osteopathy alone can be validly applied by the state to the regulation
of chiropractic.") (citing State v. Hopkins, 54 Mont. 52, 166 P. 304 (1917)); but see Sandford,
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Courts justify the same school rule in many ways. One recurrent rationale
is that it is inequitable to judge the defendant by the standards of a different
school: "The unfairness of permitting a practitioner of one school, who
uses one method to cure an ailment, to measure the treatment and skill of
a practitioner of another school, who uses a different method, must be
. . . apparent.' ' 5 Since the defendant is not a physician, courts do not
prefer to judge the chiropractor by a physician due to the differences
6
between the two in education, training and beliefs.1
A similar rationale for the same school rule is that since the plaintiff
chose to seek treatment from a practitioner of one school, the plaintiff may
not complain after the treatment that the practitioner did not conform to
another school's standards. 17 The Oregon Supreme Court stated that "a
person seeking treatment from a practitioner of a given school agrees to
accept the curative practices and belief of that particular school, and if the
practitioner treats the patient reasonably skillfully in accordance with the
8
teachings of his school he incurs no liability."'

161 Ga. App. at 497-98, 288 S.E.2d at 750. The Sandford court stated:
[O]rthopedic surgeons may testify regarding the standard of care required of
podiatrists in the diagnosis and treatment of flat feet. Their membership in a
school of practice different from that of [defendant] may affect the weight given
their opinions or evaluations but not the admissibility of those opinions ...
We herein recognize a difference between cases involving podiatrists and
allopaths and cases involving chiropractors or naturopaths and physicians. Unlike
podiatrists, the latter schools differ from the allopathic school of medicine in
their belief as to the origin of discomfort and the means of relief, and such
differences have been statutorily noted.
Id.
15. Creasey, 292 Or. at 161, 637 P.2d at 119 (quoting Sheppard v. Firth, 215 Or. 268,
272, 334 P.2d 190, 192 (1959)); see also Annotation, supra note 6, at 1023 (courts have "long
recognized that there are different schools of medicine with varying tenets and practices, and
that inequities would be occasioned by testing the care and skill of a practitioner of one school
of medicine by the opinion of a practitioner of another school").
16. See supra note 6.
17. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 64 Mich. App. 685, 695, 236 N.W.2d 543, 549 (1975);
61 AM. Jut. 2D, supra note 14, § 213.
18. Creasey, 292 Or. at 160, 637 P.2d at 118 (quoting Sheppard, 215 Or. at 271-72, 334
P.2d at 192 ("[A] person professing to follow one system or school of medicine cannot be
expected by his employer to practice any other, and if he performs a treatment with ordinary
skill and care in accordance with his system, he is not answerable for bad results.") (citation
omitted)).
Whether the plaintiff knew that the tenets of chiropractic differ from other schools of
medicine when he consulted his chiropractor is unlikely to influence a same-school court. This
is because an "actual knowledge -of the tenets" standard is not present in these courts'
decisions. See, e.g., id.; Porter v. Puryear, 153 Tex. 82, 87, 262 S.W.2d 933, 936 (1953)
("when a patient selects one of the several recognized schools of treatment, he thereby adopts
and accepts the kind of treatment common to that school") (citation omitted). However, a
question of informed consent conceivably is an issue the plaintiff could raise. See Annotation,
Modern Status of Views as to General Measure of Physician's Duty to Inform Patient of
Risks of Proposed Treatment, 88 A.L.R.3D 1008 (1978).
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A third rationale is that the jury would be confused if an expert witness
were allowed to testify against a member of a different school. The "inability
of the jury to evaluate the merits of each school's tenets and principles or
to determine which [has] the preferable mode of treatment" 19 may lead a
court to refuse to allow a physician to testify against a chiropractor. 20
B. The Overlap Exception
Many courts purporting to follow the same school requirement rely on
the many exceptions which have been developed to circumvent its requirements, and thus allow a physician to testify against a chiropractor. 21 The
major exception to the same school rule is the "overlap" exception. If there
is an overlap-an area of knowledge or treatment common to both schoolsthese courts will allow a physician to testify against a chiropractor regarding
the subject matter of the overlap. 22
In Rosenberg v. Cahill,23 the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized and

applied this overlap exception in a malpractice action against a chiropractor.
The plaintiff alleged that the chiropractor was negligent in his reading of

19. McCoid, supra note 1, at 561.
20. When the court does this, it is not making a value judgment that one school (chiropractic) is preferable to another school (allopathic) and therefore the testimony of a physician
should not be allowed. Instead, as the Creasey court stated: "[lt is apparent the courts are
not concerned with the merits of the various systems that seek to relieve human ailments. It
is sufficient to state that many of our citizens believe in the efficacy of drugless treatments
and secure the services of those practicing them." 292 Or. at 160, 637 P.2d at 118 (citation
omitted).
21. Some of the exceptions to the same school rule are: (1) "[w]here the method of
treatment in defendant's school and the school of the witness is the same," Annotation, supra
note 6, at 1026 (the so-called "overlap" exception); (2) "[w]here the method of treatment in
defendant's school and the school of the witness should be the same," id. at 1028; (3) "[w]here
testimony of witness is based on knowledge of defendant's own school," id.; (4) "[w]here
testimony of witness is as to matters of common observation and experience," id. at 1029;
(5) "[w]here in administering treatment defendant adopts methods of another school," id.; (6)
"[w]here defendant seeks to justify his course of treatment by the standards of another
school," id. at 1030; (7) where the witness "give[s] his opinion as to diagnosis," id.; (8) where
the witness "testif[ies] as to the use of X ray," id. at 1031; and (9) "[w]here defendant's
school is not recognized." Id. at 1032. For a more complete discussion of the various exceptions
to the same school rule, see Note, supra note 8, at 750-57.
22. E.g., Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1984) (under Kansas law, a
psychologist may testify in a wrongful death action against a hospital and physician); Creasey,
292 Or. at 156, 637 P.2d at 116 (orthopedic surgeon may testify against a podiatrist "[w]here
the principles, techniques, methods, practices or procedures [of the one school] concur or are
generally the same" as the other school); Sutton v. Cook, 254 Or. 116, 458 P.2d 402 (1969)
(physician may testify against chiropractor if the procedures of both schools are substantially
the same); Hart v. Van Zandt, 399 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. 1965) (osteopath may testify against a
physician because the subject matter of the litigation was recognized in both schools); Burton,
711 P.2d at 245 (member of one school may testify against a member of another school if
the methods of the two schools are identical).
23. 99 N.J. 318, 492 A.2d 371 (1985). For a discussion of Rosenberg, see Note, supra note
8.
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an x ray and in his failure to refer the plaintiff to a physician.Y The court
declared a medical doctor competent to testify regarding the "chiropractic
use of x rays and the diagnosis of physical conditions, '"2 limiting its decision
to the facts of this case. The court stated:
[I]t is clear from the statutory and regulatory scheme that there is an
overlap between the medical and chiropractic professions with respect
to both the use of x-rays and the diagnosis of conditions that may
require medical attention. In these areas, a licensed medical practitioner
would therefore possess the requisite training and knowledge to express
an opinion as an expert.2

Other courts which recognize the overlap exception allow physicians to
testify not merely concerning the chiropractic use of x rays and diagnosis,
but also concerning the chiropractic standard of care. For example, if the
plaintiff can show that a "similarity in procedures or techniques" 27 exists
or that the subject matter of the suit is recognized in both schools,2 a
physician may be declared a competent expert witness, despite the otherwise
wide variation between the schools.
C. Variant Application
Whether a physician is competent to testify in a chiropractic malpractice
action may be the determinative factor in a plaintiff's case. 29 Therefore, the
rules regarding admissibility of expert witnesses ought to be uniform so that
cases which are similar in every way except the state in which they were
brought will be decided similarly. A plaintiff in a state such as Tennessee
should not be forced to rely solely on chiropractic expert testimony because
her state strictly follows the same school rule, while a plaintiff in New
Jersey is able to introduce testimony by a physician, provided the subject
matter falls within one of the exceptions 0 to the same school rule. Further,
the result of strict adherence to the same school rule can be carried to
extremes, as one dissenting judge hypothesized:
The holding of the license is held to be the touchstone of expert
qualification. No matter how well qualified through education, training

24. The plaintiff alleged that defendant x rayed plaintiff, but did not notice soft tissue
abnormalities which appeared on the x ray of plaintiff's spine, and did not refer plaintiff to
a physician "competent to diagnose and treat these abnormalities." Rosenberg, 99 N.J. at
323, 492 A.2d at 373.
25. Id. at 334, 492 A.2d at 379.
26. Id. at 331-32, 492 A.2d at 378.
27. Creasey, 292 Or. at 163, 637 P.2d at 120; see also Sutton, 254 Or. at 123, 458 P.2d
at 405 (physician may testify against a chiropractor if the procedures of both schools are
substantially the same).
28. Hart, 399 S.W.2d at 797.
29. See Note, supra note 8, at 757 ("the ostensible ruination of an individual's life is often
contingent upon the credibility of an expert's testimony").
30. See supra note 21.
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and experience the prospective witness may be, the trial court has no
discretion to allow expert testimony unless the witness is the holder of
a license ...
. . . Under the holding a physician would be unable to testify to nursing
standards of care even though nurses operated under his supervision or
to testify to standards for midwives, and
this because the physician was
3
not licensed as a nurse or a midwife. a

Although courts are sometimes able to avoid the incorrect and unjust
results dictated by strict adherence to the same school rule, this may not
always be possible. If, for example, a plaintiff is not able to convince the
court that a new exception should be recognized or an old exception should
be applied, an incorrect or unjust result may still be reached.
Rules of evidence, developed years ago and applicable supposedly to all
witnesses, absorbed with questions of admissibility and not with proof,
persuasion and the discovery of truth, are being imposed in many
jurisdictions to prevent that free and full use of basic facts necessary to
reach a correct and just solution of a case involving a medical issue.32

Unfortunately, this situation has changed little in state courts. To prevent
further incongruous decisions concerning the standard of admissibility of a
physician's expert testimony, 33 state courts continuing to use the common
law approach should change the common law, reject the same school
requirement and its many exceptions, and adopt a more consistent rule.
II.

THE SoLUTIoN: GREATER STATE COURT USE OF FEDERAL RuLE
OF EVIDENCE 702

The state courts should begin using a standard similar to that used in
federal courts and a minority of state courts34 to determine the admissibility

31. Dolan, 77 Il1. 2d at 286-87, 396 N.E.2d at 17 (Ward, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority's holding a physician incompetent to testify against a podiatrist because he was not
licensed in defendant's school).
32. Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 VAND. L. Ray. 473, 475 (1962).
33. A second reason for rejecting the same school requirement is that its continued
application could arguably force chiropractors out of business. This argument, which is
explained more fully in Part III of this Note, develops from the possibility of chiropractors
being judged by the higher standard of care expected of a physician. This could occur if a
physician has no knowledge of the chiropractic standard of care, and yet testifies as to the
chiropractor's negligence because of the presence of some exception to the same school
requirement. This would result in the chiropractor being held to the higher standard of care
for physicians. If chiropractors are frequently held to this higher standard of care, they may
become unduly hesitant in their treatment. They may also choose to leave the practice of
chiropractic, rather than face the possibility of a malpractice judgment based on a higher
standard of care than that which traditionally is applied to their particular profession.
Whether this result is a rationale for or against rejecting the same school requirement
depends on one's view of chiropractors. The public's opinion concerning chiropractic varies
widely. Some believe that "[t]he only difference between chiropractors and witch doctors is
that chiropractic is legal." Keerdoja, A New Medical Marriage, NEwswEEK, Aug. 12, 1985,
at 69, 69 (citation omitted). On the other hand, some claim, "Sometimes I think my chiropractor
is God." Id. While this Note takes the position that chiropractors should not be forced out
of business, it is recognized that some may view a contrary result as more desirable.
34. See supra note 10.
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of a physician's expert testimony in a chiropractic malpractice action.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which governs the admissibility of expert

testimony, states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,

training or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise." 35 The advisory committee which promulgated the Federal Rules
of Evidence intended that this requirement be viewed broadly, allowing

many different types of expert witnesses to testify, provided the witness has
36
the necessary qualifications.

Despite stating the standard for admissibility of expert testimony, "[n]either
[the Federal Rules of Evidence] nor any other rule or precedent . . . sets

forth a specific method by which the trial judge must determine the
qualification of an expert." '37 Instead of detracting from the workability of

the standard, this is one of the advantages of the federal approach. Unlike
the rigid same school test, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 looks not only to
the expert witness's license or profession, but also to the possibfy relevant
information the witness possesses.38 One court which applied Federal Rule
of Evidence 702 stated:
An expert need not have certificates of training, nor memberships in
professional organizations. Nor need he be . . . an outstanding practitioner in the field in which he professes expertise. Comparisons between
his professional stature and the stature of witnesses for an opposing
party may be made by the jury, if it becomes necessary which of two
conflicting opinions to believe. But the only question for the trial judge
who must decide whether or not to allow the jury to consider a proffered
expert's opinions is, "whether his knowledge of the subject matter is
such that his 39
opinion will most likely assist the trier of fact in arriving
at the truth."

In order for the trial judge to answer this question, the proponent of the
expert witness must lay a proper foundation, 40 showing that the physician

35. FED. R. EviD. 702.

36.

FED. R. Evwo. 702 advisory committee's note. The advisory committee intended that:
[The expert [be] viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person qualified by
"knowledge, skill, experience, training or education." Thus within the scope of
the rule are not only experts in the strictest sense of the word, e.g., physicians,
physicists, and architects, but also the large group sometimes called "skilled"
witnesses, such as bankers or landowners testifying to land values.

Id.
37. United States v. Dysart, 705 F.2d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 934 (1983).
38. Cf. Comment, supra note 7, at 69 ("A physician who is familiar with the problem at
issue and can give a competent opinion on the standard of care based on education, training,
and experience should be permitted to testify against the specialist.").
39. United States v. Barker, 553 F.2d 1013, 1024 (6th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted).
40. If this foundation is not laid, the physician will not be allowed to give his expert
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is qualified to testify in the chiropractic malpractice action. "The admissibility of [expert] evidence depends in large measure upon the foundation
laid. The expertise of the witness, his degree offamiliarity with the necessary
facts, and the logical nexus between his opinion and -the facts adduced must

be established."41
A Virginia case, Maxwell v. McCaffrey,42 is a good illustration of how a
standard similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 would be applied. In
Maxwell, the Virginia Supreme Court refused to allow an orthopedic surgeon
to testify as an expert witness on the issue of chiropractic standards of skill
and care.43 Although the orthopedic surgeon had studied manipulation
intensively for one year and belonged to the North American Academy of
Manipulative Medicine, 44 he knew nothing about the training, education,
and certification of chiropractors, nor did he have any contact with chiropractors in his area. The orthopedic surgeon admitted that, although the
manipulative techniques which he used were similar to those used by
chiropractors, "each discipline manipulated on a 'completely different theory' and that chiropractors 'use other modalities' with which he was
unfamiliar. '45 After considering these factors, the court held that this
particular physician did not possess "sufficient knowledge, skill or experience to make him competent to testify as an expert" on the issue of the
standard of care required of chiropractors."

testimony. E.g., Morgan v. Hill, 663 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (physician may
not testify to the chiropractor's standard of care because he did not have the appropriate
training and experience to determine what constitutes chiropractic malpractice); Martin v.
Mott, 744 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (physician not competent to testify against
podiatrist because he did not know the appropriate standard of care of podiatrists).
For cases where a proper foundation was laid, see Payton v. Abbott Labs, 780 F.2d 147,
155-56 (Ist Cir. 1985) (clinical physicians competent to testify in a malpractice action against
a drug manufacturer, even though they were not research scientists, because they possessed
some specialized knowledge of that field); Dysart, 705 F.2d at 1251-52 (osteopath allowed to
testify as a psychiatric expert because of his education and experience); United States v. Viglia,
549 F.2d 335, 337 (5th Cir.) (pediatrician with no experience in obesity allowed to testify in
a malpractice action regarding the treating of obesity because of "his knowledge, training and
education in the fields of medicine and pharmacology"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977);
Van Sickle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 503 So.2d 1288, 1289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (orthopedic
physician may testify as an expert witness regarding chiropractic care and treatment if he
possesses "specialized 'knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education') (citation omitted).
41. Martin, 744 P.2d at 339 (quoting Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328, 1331 (Utah
1979)) (emphasis in original).
42. 219 Va. 909, 252 S.E.2d 342 (1979).
43. Id. at 912, 252 S.E.2d at 345.
44. Id. at 911, 252 S.E.2d at 344. This organization's members are all physicians, some
of whom also have chiropractic degrees. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 912, 252 S.E.2d at 345. See also Ives v. Redford, 219 Va. 838, 841, 252 S.E.2d
315, 317 (1979). In Ives the Virginia Supreme Court explains Maxwell, stating: "We upheld
the disqualification [of the orthopedic surgeon], not, however, because the specialty of the
witness differed from the defendant's specialty, but because the witness 'did not profess to
know the standards of skill and care exercised by chiropractic practitioners in the area."' Id.
(quoting Maxwell, 219 Va. at 913, 252 S.E.2d at 345).
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If the proponent of an expert witness can show the witness' familiarity
with an issue involving another school of medicine, a court following Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 would admit the expert testimony. The trier of fact
is then free to determine the credibility of the testimony. 47 "The fact that
the physician is not a specialist in the field in which he is giving his opinion
affects not the admissibility of his opinion but the weight the jury may
place on it."' 4 If the jury determines that despite the plaintiff's foundation,
the physician's testimony is not very determinative of the chiropractic
malpractice, it can choose to discount the testimony's value. However, using
the standard of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the jury-not the judgewill weigh the testimony, provided the physician's minimal familiarity with
the issue is first established.
Using this method to determine the admissibility of expert testimony in
a chiropractic malpractice action will not be difficult for those state courts
currently adhering to the traditional common law same school requirement
or for those recognizing the many exceptions to that rule. Some state courts
already use such an approach. 49 This recent trend should be encouraged in
order to unify the standard of admissibility of this evidence which often is
determinative of the success of the plaintiff's prima facie case.
III.

THE EFFECT: A CHANGE IN CHmOPRACTIC MALPRACTICE
ACTIONS

Greater adherence to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 by state courts will
affect chiropractic malpractice actions in three ways. First, three substantive
areas of chiropractic liability will change: treatment, referral, and diagnosis.
Second, plaintiffs who bring chiropractic malpractice actions will have a
potentially greater pool from which to choose their expert witnesses. Finally,
the practice of chiropractic will change in the following ways: (1) chiropractors who meet the chiropractic standard of care will be secure in their
practice; and (2) chiropractic educational and licensure requirements may
be increased.
A. Changes in ChiropracticLiability
The three main areas of chiropractic liability which will be affected
through greater use of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 by state courts are the

47. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 7, at 70.
48. Payton, 780 F.2d at 155 (citation omitted).
49. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 42-46. See also Kerkman v. Hintz, 142 Wis.
2d 404, 423, 418 N.W.2d 795, 803 (1988) ("one who is not licensed to practice chiropractic
may testify regarding the standard of care for a chiropractor if qualified as an expert in the

area in which testimony will be given").
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treatment of patients, the referral of patients to a medical doctor when
necessary, and the diagnosis
of a chiropractic condition, as contrasted with
50
a medical condition.
1. Failure to treat properly
First, following Federal Rule of Evidence 702 would have an effect on
determining whether the chiropractor treated the patient with the proper
skill. This was at issue in Johnson v. Lawrence,5 1 the Tennessee case
discussed in Part I. The Johnson court applied a same school analysis and
found the testimony of medical doctors to be incompetent when offered
against a chiropractor. 5 2 If the court would have used an analysis similar
to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, it would have required that the medical
doctors have specialized knowledge of the standard of skill required of
53
chiropractors, and not that the expert witnesses be licensed chiropractors.
However, looking at the facts of the case, it is probable that the testimony
still would not have been admitted. The physicians admitted that they were
unfamiliar with the chiropractic standard of care,5 4 and were therefore
incompetent to express an expert opinion regarding the defendant's manipulation of the plaintiff's neck. However, if the plaintiff in Johnson had
produced a physician with knowledge of the appropriate standard of care,
the physician would have been allowed to testify under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702.
A physician might also be required to know the basic tenets of the branch
of chiropractic to which the chiropractor adheres. 5 There are two branches
of chiropractic.5 6 The first branch is known as "straights." Straights only
use their hands when treating patients. The second branch is known as
"mixers." Mixers use not only their hands to treat patients, but also light,

50. See Mostrom v. Pettibon, 25 Wash. App. 158, 163, 607 P.2d 864, 867 (1980); see
generally Stutt, Negligence of Drugless Healers, Chiropractors,58 Wis. B. BULL. No. 7, July,
1985, at 22 (discussing the three main areas of chiropractic liability).
51. 720 S.W.2d 50 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). See also supra text accompanying notes 13 &
14.
52. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
53. Johnson, 720 S.W.2d at 54.
54. Id.
55. See Kerkman v. Hintz, 138 Wis. 2d 131, 144 n.8, 406 N.W.2d 156, 161 n.8 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 142 Wis. 2d 404, 418 N.W.2d
795 (1988), where the court did not require that the defendant's branch of chiropractic be
familiar to the expert witness. However, the court left open the possibility that this factor
might be required in the future if additional evidence is shown to necessitate this "legal
component of the standard." Id.
56. Stutt, supra note 50, at 24. Stutt believes that "this dichotomy is simplistic in that
there are numerous chiropractic schools which offer more than two approaches to the student.
The practitioner may use treatment modes such as acupressure or kinesiology which were
learned at seminars or in later reading." Id.
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vitamins, heat and electricity.17 Depending on the professional standard of
the treating chiropractor's branch, a particular treatment may or may not
be deemed appropriate.
By requiring a physician to have specialized knowledge of the appropriate

standard of care for chiropractors in general, a court following Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 ensures that the defendant-chiropractor will be held

to the standard of care of a reasonable chiropractor, not that of a reasonable
physician. However, a court following Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is not
limited to admitting only chiropractic expert testimony on the issue of
standard of care; the court may also admit a physician's testimony in certain
circumstances. The reasonable chiropractor standard should govern in these
58
cases, assuming the plaintiff chose to seek treatment from a chiropractor,

aware that chiropractic treatment and philosophy can differ from medical

treatment and philosophy.5 9

2.

Failure to refer to a physician

Second, following Federal Rule of Evidence 702 would have an impact
on proving whether a chiropractor should have treated the plaintiff's injuries. In cases where the plaintiff claims that the chiropractor negligently
failed to refer the plaintiff to a physician, the plaintiff's expert witness will
be required to have specialized knowledge of what injuries and diseases the
chiropractic profession is able to cure. 60 Failure to refer was one cause of
action relied on by the plaintiff in Rosenberg v. Cahill,61 discussed in Part
I of this Note. Using the overlap exception, the court declared a physician
2
competent to testify regarding the conditions that require medical attention.6
If the Rosenberg court had used Federal Rule of Evidence 702, it would

57. Id.

58. For a more complete discussion of the underlying issue of informed consent, see
Annotation, Chiropractor'sLiability for Failure to Refer Patient to Medical Practitioner,58
A.L.R.3D 590 (1974).
59. See supra notes 1-3, 6 and accompanying text.
60. For a collection of cases finding a cause of action for a chiropractor's failure to refer
a plaintiff to a medical doctor, see Annotation, supra note 18.
61. 99 N.J. 318, 492 A.2d 371 (1985).
62. Id. at 331, 492 A.2d at 378. See also supra text accompanying notes 21-26.
Using the proposed standard, the physician would have been required to show familiarity
with the conditions which chiropractic can cure, rather than an "overlap" between the two
schools.
If the injury or disease does fall within the realm of chiropractic cure, see supra note 3
(listing some of the most common ailments chiropractors treat), and if the legislature has
authorized this form of cure, see supra note 2 and accompanying text, a physician's expert
testimony on the issue of his duty to refer might not be helpful to the plaintiff. While a
physician would be competent to testify regarding referral, provided the physician has the
requisite knowledge, testimony that a physician could have more effectively treated the plaintiff
had the chiropractor referred the plaintiff to him could be found irrelevant. This assumes that
the plaintiff was fully informed and consented to the chiropractor's treatment.
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not have had to find an overlap between the schools in order to declare
the physician competent to testify. Applying Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
if the injury or disease is outside of the reach of chiropractic, a physician
with knowledge of the appropriate reach of chiropractic would be allowed
to testify. 63
3.

Failure to diagnose correctly

A third area of chiropractic liability which adoption of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 will affect is the duty to diagnose a patient's condition
properly. 64 If the plaintiff claims that the chiropractor failed to diagnose a
problem correctly, the plaintiff's expert witness will be required to have
specialized knowledge about diagnosis in general. As the New Jersey Supreme Court explains, specialized knowledge about chiropractic diagnosis is
not necessary:
With respect to . . .diagnosis, there is a commonality of education,
training, and licensure between the chiropractic and medical professions. . . .Chiropractic licensure ...contemplates considerable education and knowledge on the part of the chiropractic practitioner with
respect to the general field of diagnosis, presumably covering conditions
that fall within the field of chiropractic as well6 as those more properly
attributed to other licensed healing disciplines.
Some chiropractors might argue that it is unfair to allow a physician to
judge a chiropractic diagnosis because chiropractors do not receive as much
training and education in diagnosis as physicians do." There are two
responses to this argument.
First, at least one study has found that "the education and training of a
registered chiropractor are sufficient to enable him to determine whether
there are contraindications to spinal manual therapy in a particular case,
and whether the patient should have medical care instead of or as well as
chiropractic care." 67 This suggests that while the education and training in

63. Not all courts will recognize, however, that a chiropractor has a duty to refer a patient
to a physician when chiropractic is not able to help the patient. For example, in Kerkman v.
Hintz, 142 Wis. 2d 404, 421, 418 N.W.2d 795, 802 (1988), the court held that a "chiropractor
does not have a duty to refer [a] patient to a medical doctor" when the patient's problem is
not within the realm of chiropractic cure. The court found that "implicit in a requirement
that a chiropractor refer a patient to a medical doctor is the imposition on the chiropractor
to make a medical determination that the patient needs medical care." Id. It then concluded
that "such a determination could not be made without employing medical knowledge," which
the chiropractor is not licensed to do. Id. at 421, 418 N.W.2d at 802-03.
64. This was a second cause of action set forth in Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. at 323,
492 A.2d at 373, discussed supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
65. Rosenberg, 99 N.J. at 331, 492 A.2d at 377-78 (footnote and citations omitted).
66. See N. ATmAN,supra note 6, at 93 (chiropractors "do not receive the same amount
of training in symptomatology as medical doctors" receive).
67. Id. (citation omitted).
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diagnosis may be different for chiropractors and physicians, they are not
so different that a chiropractor's diagnosis and decision to treat a plaintiff
should not be judged by a physician.
Second, if chiropractors feel disadvantaged in their education and training
in diagnosis, chiropractic colleges should require that their graduates devote
more class hours to diagnosis. This would lead to several positive results.
Chiropractors' education and training in diagnosis would be more similar
to physicians', making it seem more equitable to use a physician's testimony
to evaluate a chiropractor's diagnosis. More importantly, chiropractic patients will be better protected from an incorrect diagnosis due to their
68
chiropractor's insufficient training.
B. Changes in Plaintiff's Presentation of Evidence
Greater state court use of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 will also have
an effect on the plaintiff's ability to present expert testimony in a chiropractic malpractice action. Plaintiffs will be encouraged to establish negligence through a chiropractor's, rather than a physician's, expert testimony.
This will occur because the foundation for an expert witness who is a
chiropractor necessarily will be easier to lay than that of a physician. Instead
of having to convince the court that, although not a chiropractor, the
witness is familiar with the chiropractic issue at hand, the plaintiff using a
chiropractor as an expert witness will only have to show that the witness is
69
a chiropractor.
While the plaintiff may find the testimony of a chiropractor easier to
introduce, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 will not exclude valuable testimony
by physicians whom the plaintiff can prove to be qualified to testify. If the
plaintiff were forced to rely on expert testimony by chiropractors, it is
possible that he could not find a chiropractor who would agree to testify
against another chiropractor. 70 This might be due to a "conspiracy of
silence" which may exist among chiropractors, 71 as some claim about
physicians. 72 As one commentator explains:
68. This Note does not suggest that a chiropractor's education and training must be equal
to that of a physician. However, by receiving more training and education in diagnosis than
they currently do, chiropractors will perhaps "know enough not to injure their patients and
to recognize cases where their limited methods are inefficacious and the services of a doctor
are required." Rosenberg, 99 N.J. at 333, 492 A.2d at 378 (quoting Kelly v. Carrol, 36 Wash.
2d 482, 492, 219 P.2d 79, 85, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950)).
69. If for some reason the chiropractor is not competent to testify, it would then be the
task of the defendant to expose that incompetence.
70. Stutt, supra note 50, at 24.
71. See id.
72. See, e.g., Note, Malpractice and Medical Testimony, 77 HAgv. L. Rav. 333, 336
(1963). The author quotes a dissenting judge who criticized:
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Chiropractors may be unwilling to testify concerning the negligence of
a fellow chiropractor. The absence of in-state teaching professors secure
in their jobs and free from professional repercussions contributes to this
hesitancy. The courts have not adequately dealt with such a cloak of
silence in a uniform way. Justice is denied to an injured patient if his
rights can not be vindicated because of proof standards which fail to
account for the realities of the marketplace. The collegial nature of these
drugless healers seems to predominate over any motion [sic] that proper
chiropractic care takes an effort to speak out when such care is not
provided.Y

By allowing physicians familiar with chiropractic to testify against a
chiropractor, this conspiracy among chiropractors can be circumvented,
helping the plaintiff to prove his case. This may also encourage chiropractors
themselves to break the alleged conspiracy. Faced with the prospect of a
member of their profession being judged by a physician, chiropractors may
be more willing to testify for the plaintiff in a chiropractic malpractice
action.

C. Changes in the Practice of Chiropractic
State court use of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 would also have an
effect on the practice of chiropractic. First of all, any "chilling effect" on
chiropractors, which might cause them to be unnecessarily cautious in
treating their patients, may be reduced. Because the chiropractor will be
judged by a chiropractor or a physician with chiropractic knowledge, the
chiropractor will not be judged by the potentially higher standard of care
expected of physicians.
This standard of care is attractive because it measures a chiropractor's
actions against other reasonable and ordinary chiropractors who are also

Anyone familiar with cases of this character knows that the so-called ethical
practitioner will not testify on behalf of a plaintiff regardless of the merits of
his case.... But regardless of the merits of the plaintiffs case, physicians who
are members of medical societies flock to the defense of their fellow members
charged with malpractice and the plaintiff is relegated, for his expert testimony,
to the occasional lone wolf or heroic soul, who for the sake of truth and justice
has the courage to run the risk of ostracism by his fellow practitioners and the
cancellation of his public liability insurance policy.
Id. (quoting Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 484, 234 P.2d 34, 46 (1951) (Carter, J.,
dissenting)). See also Mason v. Ellsworth, 3 Wash. App. 298, 309, 474 P.2d 909, 917 (1970)
(recognizing a "so-called 'conspiracy of silence'); Annotation, MedicalMalpractice:Necessity
and Sufficiency of Showing of Medical Witness' Familiaritywith ParticularMedical or Surgical
Technique Involved in Suit, 46 A.L.R.3D 275, 278 (1972) ("Locating an expert to testify for
the plaintiff in a malpractice action is known to be a very difficult task, particularly because,
in many cases, a doctor is reluctant and unwilling to testify against a fellow practitioner
73. Stutt, supra note 50, at 24, 47.
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restricted in their treatment by the four corners of the chiropractic
license. This standard of care also provides sufficient protection for the
patient public because it ensures that a chiropractor will perform reasonably within the chiropractic field or face malpractice liability. Moreover, if a chiropractor performs outside the practice authorized by the
chiropractic license into other areas of the healing arts, the chiropractor
assumes the same standard of care mandated for practitioners
in those
7
areas and the corresponding potential for liability. '

Knowing that they will be held to this standard of care, chiropractors
conforming to the chiropractic standard of care will be more secure in their
practice than under current state rules of admissibility. Chiropractors will
thus not be overly hesitant in their treatment or diagnosis.
A second effect on the practice of chiropractic, suggested above, 7 may
be the modification of the requirements of either chiropractic education or
licensure. In order that chiropractors not be routinely held liable for failure
to make proper diagnosis, chiropractic colleges may decide to increase the
number of classroom hours spent in diagnosis training. 76 This will bring the
chiropractor's education closer to the physician's in the diagnosis area and
may ensure that chiropractors "know enough not to injure their patients
and to recognize cases where their limited methods are inefficacious and
'77
the services of a doctor are required."
CONCLUSION

The time has come for uniformity among state court standards governing
the admissibility of expert testimony by physicians in chiropractic malpractice actions. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 appears to be the best solution
to the debate over the appropriate guidelines to use in making this determination. By allowing a physician to testify once his familiarity with the
relevant chiropractic issue has been established, justice will be better served.
Injured plaintiffs will not be denied redress when a chiropractic expert

74. Kerkman, 138 Wis. 2d at 144-45, 406 N.W.2d at 162 (citation omitted) (explaining
why the correct standard should be that of a reasonable chiropractor and not that of a
reasonable member of a medical profession). The Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed with the
court of appeals that the correct standard was not that of a reasonable medical professional,
but believed that the standard should be limited even more than that proposed by the court
of appeals. The supreme court's standard "recognize[ld] limitations imposed by the legislature
upon chiropractors." Kerkman, 142 Wis. 2d at 420, 418 N.W.2d at 802. Its standard was thus
even more beneficial to the chiropractor than the court of appeals' "reasonable chiropractor"
standard.
75. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
76. Id.
77. Rosenberg, 99 N.J. at 333, 492 A.2d at 378 (quoting Kelly, 36 Wash. 2d at 492, 219
P.2d at 85). For a related view, compare Note, supra note 8, at 761, which advocates
"legislative scrutiny and the revamping of chiropractic licensing laws." Id.
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cannot be found. Chiropractors will not be able to hide behind a veil of
silence or avoid being held liable by refusing to testify against one another.
Nor will chiropractors be forced out of business by being held to the
standards of physicians. Uniform decisions in this area of common public
concern are desirable, and will be best achieved through nationwide use of
Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
SusAN M. HOBSON

